

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



17 March 1971


Central Intelligence Agency  
Attn: Mr. George Carver  
Room 6F19

1. Attached is a draft statement of intelligence requirements, from the military point of view, for the Indochina area for use in the Ad Hoc Committee deliberations. These generally support military objectives through the next two years insofar as can be determined at this time. Some consideration has been given to the time period through mid-1976.

2. In view of the fact that the military situation in SEA is subject to rapid change, many of the requirement statements are necessarily quite general. Perhaps statements of national objectives for use by the committee would help focus the intelligence requirements.



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
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DIA review(s) completed.

*DIA Input*

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MEMORANDUM FOR

(S) Intelligence Requirements.

a. Strategy, Plans, Intentions, and Doctrine

(1) Plans and intentions of North Vietnam, in concert with indigenous communists or other antigovernmental factions, to continue its military operations and to support the insurgencies in Indochina.

(2) Plans and intentions of Communist China to continue support to NVN and the insurgents of South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, and/or to attack countries of Indochina, alone or in concert with North Vietnam.

(3) Plans and intentions of the USSR and other communist nations to provide military support to North Vietnam and/or the insurgents of South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.

(4) Plans, intentions, and capability of the countries of Indochina to conduct military operations, to establish and maintain political stability, and to advance social and economic development.

b. Warning of Attack. Maximum prior warning of an attack by North Vietnam or Communist China.

c. Net Threat Assessment. The general purpose forces that North Vietnam and/or Communist China could bring to bear in Asia at any one time.

d. North Vietnamese Assessments. North Vietnamese assessments regarding their relative military capabilities vis-a-vis the other countries of Southeast Asia.

e. Communist China's Assessments. Communist China's view of the situation in Indochina vis-a-vis the US and Soviet influence there, to include its assessment of the potential threat to Chinese borders.

f. Capabilities and Vulnerabilities of North Vietnam.

(1) Force structure and organization of general purpose forces.

(2) Force levels for each year through 1 July 1973, for ground, air, and naval forces, and force level trends through 1 July 1976.

(3) Disposition and composition of ground, air, and naval forces during the mid-range.

(4) Principal weapons by type, numbers, characteristics, performance, and initial operational capabilities for new weapons.

(5) Operational capabilities and employment doctrine.

(6) State of training and readiness of ground, naval, and air forces.

(7) Major changes in force posture.

(8) Vulnerabilities of armed forces.

g. PRC Capabilities and Vulnerabilities. Force structure, disposition, and readiness status of Chinese Communist forces in South China.

h. Target Information. Identification, location, functional and physical characteristics, and precise geodetic coordinates of key targets associated with the North Vietnamese Forces and urban areas, and communist forces and installations in southern China. Targets should include logistics systems, command and control centers, and communications facilities.

i. Military Electronics. Identification of military electronic equipment associated with NVN and Chinese Communist general purpose forces.

j. Command and Control. The national and military systems for controlling the armed forces of NVN and Communist China.

k. Military Materiel Production. Production capacity and rates for North Vietnam.

l. Military Logistic Capability of North Vietnam.

m. Counterintelligence. North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist espionage, sabotage, and subversion (including plans, intentions, and operations) against their Indochina neighbors and US Forces and installations.

n. Political and Economic Factors. Significant political leadership, party structures and philosophies, and basic economic conditions in NVN and Communist China.

o. Organization, Disposition, and Capabilities of the Insurgent Elements in the Countries of Indochina.